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Abstract Individuals often need to negotiate how to distribute jointly produced
goods—equally (e.g., 50:50) or equitably (e.g., proportionally to their contribu-
tions). We examined whether people have stable preferences, or whether they
switch between equality and equity in different situations. Pairs of anonymous
participants first produced a common pie, and then distributed it in an ultimatum
game. Results suggest that individuals apply different justice principles depending
on their contribution. When they produced less than 50%, proposers divided the pie
equally. However, when they produced more than 50%, their offers fell between
equality and equity. Responders’ ratings of fairness and satisfaction varied simi-
larly; with low production, equality was preferred, whereas with high production,
equity was preferred. Nevertheless, equal and equitable offers were generally
accepted, and only outright unfair offers were rejected. This suggests that indi-
viduals are relatively flexible about which justice principle should be applied, but
punish proposers whose offers violate both principles.
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Introduction
Alex and Sam were young, dynamic, and optimistic when they started a company
together. They quickly established the right contacts in the market and developed a
high-quality, successful product. When after a few years a buyer offered a good
price for their company, the two friends were happy to make the deal. However,
when Alex proposed to share the pie 60/40, things quickly turned sour. What do
individuals consider fair in a situation where both contribute to a shared good, and
both have a say in its distribution?
Several justice principles may be applied to this kind of situation, in particular,
equality or equity (Homans, 1961; Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975). With equality,
goods are distributed evenly, and with equity, goods are distributed according to
individuals’ inputs. These principles generate expectations about the fair distribu-
tion of goods. However, there may be considerable variation in what is considered
fair, because different justice principles can be applied to the same situation. This is
because individuals may consider different inputs as sources of entitlement when
judging the fairness of their own situation or between others, such as the efforts
invested in the production of a good, contributions to the effective productivity,
transaction histories between individuals, positions, ownership, property rights, and
laws (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986b). These sources of entitlement can be
called upon to apply different justice principles. For example, in a situation where
individuals of similar status invested different amounts of effort, Sam may focus on
status and distribute goods equally, whereas Alex may focus on effort and distribute
goods equitably.
A discrepancy between an individual’s expectation and what he or she is offered
results in perceptions of injustice (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982). This has dramatic
emotional and behavioral consequences. For example, perceived injustice is a
primary source of anger and other negative emotions towards individuals and
companies (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Szymanski & Henard, 2001). It
also leads individuals to decrease their effort (Ga¨chter & Tho¨ni, 2010) and to punish
responsible others (Fehr, Goette, & Zehnder, 2009). In contrast, experiencing
fairness increases subjective happiness and activates reward regions in the brain
(Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004; Tabibnia & Lieberman, 2007).
Given the impact of fairness perceptions on emotions, motivation, and behavior, it is
fundamental to better understand how individuals utilize justice principles, and what
they perceive as fair.
A situation with conflicting entitlements and joint decision-making power may be
approached in several ways. It may be sufficient for a proposed distribution to
correspond to any justice principle to be considered fair, allowing one party to select
the justice principle that best fits his/her interests in any particular situation. Or,
individuals may be wed to a particular justice principle (e.g., equality), and show
similar behaviors regardless of the particular situation. Existing research cannot tell
us which possibility is more likely. In particular, some studies on behavior in the
ultimatum game (UG; Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) and its variant, the
dictator game (DG; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986a; Forsythe, Horowitz,
Savin, & Sefton, 1994) suggest that justice principles may vary across individuals,
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while others suggest that justice principles vary across situations. After a brief
review of this research, we describe the current study, in which we analyze the
application of justice principles with repeated UGs and varying entitlements based
on the invested effort in creating a joint pie.
Entitlements and Justice Principles in the DG and the UG
The UG and the DG have been extensively used to study individuals’ perception of
fairness. In both games, one of the players (dictator or proposer) is endowed an
amount of money to split between herself and another player. In the DG, the other
player (receiver) is passive. In the UG, however, the other player (responder) can
accept or reject the proposed distribution. In case of a rejection, neither player
receives goods.
Unlike dictators in the DG, proposers in the UG must anticipate the entitlements
of the responder who has the power to reject an offer that is viewed as unfair
(Bolton & Zwick, 1995). In other words, both players have decision-making power
that can affect both partners’ outcomes. Offers in the UG are generally higher than
in the DG (for a review, see Camerer, 2003), indicating that proposers take into
account that responders feel entitled to a certain share of the pie. Responders’
emotions and their decisions to reject an offer depend on the offer itself (Pillutla &
Murnighan, 1996; van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006), and on additional
factors, such as attributions of intentionality (Blount, 1995).
In the classical version of the games, there is no clear manipulation of
entitlements to justify an unequal distribution, and, across cultures, individuals show
an aversion to inequality (Henrich et al., 2006). Inequality aversion is also prevalent
in children (Almas, Cappelen, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2010) and has been
observed in other species (Brosnan & De Waal, 2003; Range, Horn, Viranyi, &
Huber, 2009). The ability to distinguish between sources of entitlement seems to
emerge later in adolescence (Almas et al., 2010). It is also observed in a few primate
species, suggesting that the sensitivity to entitlements and injustice has evolutionary
roots (Scherer, 1992; Glimcher, Camerer, Poldrack, & Fehr, 2009).
The importance of entitlements for individual’s expectations about fairness
becomes evident, firstly, in research with a systematic manipulation of dictators’/
proposers’ entitlements. For example, dictators and proposers take more of the pie
when they have earned it (e.g., through performance in a quiz), when they earned
the right to be in their position, and when they have property rights over the pie
(Hoffman, Mccabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Hoffman, Mccabe, & Smith, 1996;
Cherry, Frykblom, & Shogren, 2002; Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 2008;
Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008).
Secondly, studies varying the entitlements of the recipient/responder show that
individuals are sensitive to others’ entitlements. For example, dictators take bigger
pie shares when they play with recipients who won a large pie by chance compared
to when they play with skilled recipients who earned a large pie by performance,
suggesting that they consider effort and skills as appropriate sources of entitlement,
but not luck (Ruffle, 1998;Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008). The importance of taking into
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account others’ entitlements is also evident in studies on the social distance between
players. For example, in the DG, dictators take more when awareness of the other
player is reduced due to anonymity (e.g., playing with an individual in a different
room, no knowledge of others’ names; e.g., (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Charness &
Gneezy, 2008) or due to a lack of realism (e.g., subjects’ doubts about the presence
of another person; (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Kurki, 2004). The importance of
others’ entitlements is also evident in research on coalition formation where the
mean division of a resource reflects a compromise between different justice
principles (see review in Komorita & Chertkof, 1973).
While entitlements have been examined for both the UG and the DG, research on
the variability of preferences for justice principles has primarily focused on the DG.
In a study on individual differences (Cappelen, Hole, Sorensen, & Tungodden,
2007), the authors describe three groups of subjects characterized by different
behaviors (see also Almas et al., 2010). Egalitarian individuals believe that all
inequalities are unfair. In contrast, libertarian and meritocratic individuals deem
some inequalities justified. For meritocratic individuals, only inequalities that arise
from factors under individual control (e.g., efficiency, achievements) are acceptable,
whereas libertarian individuals judge that factors determined by chance also
represent legitimate sources of entitlement, and thus inequalities. In the study by
Cappelen et al. (2007), individuals showed little variation across situations, but
there were only two rounds of the game, which may not have been sufficient to
capture variability across situations.
Other DG research has found that the application of justice principles varies across
situations. A common finding from the DG is that individuals appear to have a selfish
bias when distributing earned goods to people they do not know; individuals who
perform poorly apply an equality principle, and individuals who perform well apply an
equity principle (Frohlich et al., 2004; Rodriguez-Lara & Moreno-Garrido, 2010).
This is consistent with the idea that individuals have an egocentric bias in judgments of
fairness (Messick & Sentis, 1979; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992; Loewenstein,
Issacharoff, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993; Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, &
Camerer, 1995), and that individuals approach coalition formation problems with a
self-serving bias based on the strength of their position (Komorita & Chertkof, 1973).
In contrast, the existence of a social bond between players may reverse the selfish bias.
In a face to face interaction, individuals may aim to appear humble and polite by
suggesting equal splits when they perform well, and equitable splits when they
perform poorly (Mikula, 1980; Schwinger, 1980). Similar tendencies may occur when
future interactions are expected between players (Shapiro, 1975).
The reviewed research demonstrates that individuals may be biased in which
justice principle they select, but the nature of this bias is not entirely clear, because
most studies employed only one-shot games in between-subject designs. Individuals
may continue to apply a particular justice principle once selected, suggesting that
the bias is only an initial process that increases the salience of a particular justice
principle that is later maintained (e.g., to maintain personal integrity across
situations). Alternatively, individuals may flexibly switch back and forth between
justice principles to achieve an advantageous outcome in each situation. To examine
the flexible application of justice principles, a within-subject design with several
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rounds of the game is required. Also, in previous studies, the entitlement of only one
player was varied (e.g., Ruffle, 1998), or only one player had decision-making
power (e.g., Frohlich et al. 2004). It has not been examined how players negotiate
the conflict between their perceived entitlements in a situation where both players
make different contributions to a shared pie, and both have decision-making power
in the distribution of this jointly produced good. This scenario is particularly
relevant to real-life situations, as illustrated in the example above. Hence, the
present study was designed to investigate this question.
Present Study
In the current study, we examine which justice principle individuals select to solve
the conflict between perceived entitlements in joint decision-making situations.
Similar to previous studies (Ruffle, 1998; Gantner, Guth, & Konigstein, 2001;
Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 2007; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008), production-
based entitlements were created through a joint-production phase preceding the UG.
Ostensibly, pairs of participants performed a math quiz in which cumulative
performance determined the size of the pie that was later distributed between the
players in the UG. In reality, each participant played with a computer. In a within-
subjects design, we programmed the computer’s production to be lower than that of
the participant in four trials, and higher than that of the participant in four different
trials. Following the production and for each of the low and high production
conditions, participants were assigned to be in one trial the proposer or in three trials
the responder. Proposers were asked to offer a split. Responders were asked to
accept or reject three different splits: an equitable split (i.e., proportional to
productions), an equal split (i.e., 50:50), or an unfair and unfavorable split (i.e.,
90:10). In addition to accept/reject decision, participants also judged the fairness of
and their satisfaction with the three types of splits. This resulted in a 2 (production:
low, high) by 4 (proposer, responder equity, responder equality, responder unfair)
within-subjects design (Table 1). The order of the eight trials was determined at
random for each participant.
Several types of proposer behavior can be hypothesized. First, in case of a selfish
bias (Frohlich et al., 2004; Rodriguez-Lara & Moreno-Garrido, 2010), proposers
would apply an equality norm and divide the pie equally when they contribute less
Table 1 Experimental design
Distribution
Position (offer): Proposer Responder
(Equality)
Responder
(Unfair)
Responder
(Equity)
(% of the pie)
Production
Low (\50%) N = 34 N = 36 N = 37 N = 36
High ([50%) N = 28 N = 25 N = 25 N = 25
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than the other player, and they would apply an equity norm and divide the pie
proportionally to productions when they contribute more.
Alternatively, individuals may show stable preferences for particular justice
principles (Cappelen et al., 2007). The preference may be due to individual differences
(e.g., stable preference for equal splits regardless of the particular entitlements), or due
to the maintenance of an initially advantageous principle (e.g., stable preference for
equal splits following low performance in the first round). In Fig. 1, equitable splits are
represented by a dotted line and equal splits are represented by a dashed line, whereas
selfish offers are indicated by offers above both lines.
Two types of responder behavior can be expected. First, participants may show a
similar selfish bias as proposers and prefer the most advantageous justice principle in
each situation. This would result in participants accepting equal splits and rejecting
equitable splits in the low production, but accepting equitable and rejecting equal splits
in the high production condition. Second, participants may accept offers that conform
to one of the justice principles (equality or equity) and only reject outright unfair offers
that violate all justice principles. This would result in participants accepting equal and
equitable splits irrespective of the production condition.
Method
Subjects
Thirty-one students (16 men, mean age 24, range 19–29) from the University of
Geneva participated in this study in return for payment. Of an initial sample of 33,
data from two subjects could not be recorded and analyzed due to computer failure.
Procedure
Groups of 16 and 17 participants were recruited. On arrival, participants received
detailed information about the study before signing consent forms. They were then
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of proposers’ behavior in relation to different justice principles
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divided in two groups and directed to different rooms to preserve anonymity and
realism about the study (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1994; Frohlich et al., 2004).
Participants were told that they would play eight rounds of a two-phase interactive
game with different partners, all situated in the other room. To reduce subjects’
doubts about the interactions with other players, we used an animation depicting the
connection process of the computers’ interaction (Fig. 2). The production and
distribution phases of the game were carefully explained, as well as the monetary
reward structure.
Measures
Production Phase
Each participant and his or her presumed partner were asked to solve as many
simple mathematical operations as possible in 25 s. For each correct answer of
either the participant or his or her presumed partner, 2 CHF were added to the pair’s
common pot. However, in case of an incorrect answer, or if no answer had been
chose an ID number between 0 and 999
IP: 169.194.204. 8
IP: 169.194.204….
IP: 169.194.204….
IP: 169.194.204.7
IP: 169.194.204….
IP: 169.194.204.34
IP: 169.194.204….
IP: 169.194.204….
synchronizing with other players
…please wait…
IP: 169.194.204. 8
IP: 169.194.204.54
IP: 169.194.204.30
IP: 169.194.204.7
IP: 169.194.204.11
IP: 169.194.204.34
IP: 169.194.204.1
IP: 169.194.204.21
synchronization OK
press Enter to continue
selection of the players
…please wait…
players
press Enter to continue
you must answer as many 
questions as possible in 25 
seconds in order to make the 
pie as big as possible
press Enter to continuepress Enter to continue
5 CHF
BA
you have produced 
6 CHF
press Enter to continuepress Enter to continue
BA
you must distribute  
6 CHF
The computer will first 
determine your roles
press Enter to continuepress Enter to continue
attribution of roles
…please wait… attribution of roles
press Enter to continue
6 CHF
A B
3 CHF 3 CHF
Accept
3/3
Reject
0/0
Fig. 2 Participants’ screens for a round of the task (i.e., production and distribution). Participants first
choose a number that will identify them throughout the experiment. Then, they go through a series of
‘‘synchronization’’ animations aimed at increasing the realism of our random matching with different
anonymous players located in the other room. Thus, the first screen is shown only once per participant,
whereas the other screens are presented in each of the eight rounds. Each round comprises five steps:
(i) matching and synchronization with other players; (ii) random matching with a specific partner; (iii)
production; (iv) random allocation of roles; (v) distribution
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given within 5 s, 2 CHF were removed from the common pot. Throughout the
production phase, continuous feedback indicated the precise size of the joint-
production in CHF (i.e., the sum of CHF earned by both players, constituting the
shared pie to be split in a subsequent UG), while each player’s performance/
production was represented via a colored graphical display. In other words, at each
moment of the production phase, participants knew exactly how much money was
in the shared pie, but they could only get a rough estimate of whether they
performed better or worse than the other player, and thereby of their absolute (in
CHF) or relative (in %) contribution to the joint pie.
To manipulate the Production condition, we programmed the computer
representing the presumed partner to perform better than the participant in the
four low production trials, and worse in the four high production trials respectively,
with a random trial order. The two performance/production conditions were created
by adjusting the presumed partner’s performance online using a self-made
algorithm. After each math operation, the computer’s performance was adjusted
by adding or subtracting a number of points (pseudorandom between 0 and 3) to the
actual participant’s performance. Presuming that participants’ performance would
not change drastically throughout the 25 s math quiz, adding points to the computer
results in a low performance condition for the participant, and subtracting points
from the computer in a high performance condition for the participant.
Distribution Phase (UG)
On proposer trials, participants indicated their offers on a slider that they could
move freely between zero and the total amount of the pie. On responder trials, the
computer was programmed to make one of three offers in random order: an equal
offer (50:50 split of the pie), an equitable offer (i.e., production-based split of the
pie) and an unfair offer (10 and 90% of the pie for the participant and his or her
presumed partner, respectively). Responders’ reactions to different offers were
assessed with three indicators. First, we asked participants to accept or reject the
offer. After their choice, they were then asked to rate the perceived satisfaction with
the proposed split on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). Half of the
participants made satisfaction ratings, and the other half made both fairness and
satisfaction ratings.1 Although outcome fairness and favorability are often
correlated (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001), differences in people’s judgments
of fairness and satisfaction suggest that they may actually reflect distinguishable
psychological constructs (van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998; Skitka,
Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003). In particular, fairness judgments appear to be
governed by an expectation matching proposition, whereas satisfaction judgments
are determined by the value of the actual outcome to the individual (Cherry,
Ordonez, & Gilliland, 2003).
1 There was no difference between the first and the second half of participants with regards to proposers’
offers and responders’ decisions and satisfaction ratings (all T’s \ 1). Hence, this additional rating did not
affect behavior.
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Results
Preliminary Considerations
Out of 248 observations, 18 trials had to be re-assigned from the high to the low
production condition, because participants’ performance during the math quiz
declined more strongly than the algorithm used to reduce the computer’s
performance, and to thereby generate a high production condition for the
participant. Similarly, two trials did not correspond to any condition because
participant and computer performance did not differ, which means that participant
produced exactly 50% of the pie, such that equality and equity could not be
dissociated. As a result, the sample sizes in different conditions varied between 25
and 37 (Table 1).
On average, the common pie was CHF 4.4 ± 2.0. A repeated measures ANOVA
showed that there was a main effect of production condition (low vs. high),
F(1,27) = 354, p \ .001), but no effect of role (proposer vs. responder), and no
interaction. The common pie was smaller in the high (CHF 3.0) compared to the low
(CHF 5.5) production condition, F(1,27) = 354, p \ .001. To control for differ-
ences in pie size, further analyses were conducted on the percentages of the pie.
Participants’ production was higher in the high (66%) compared to the low (31%)
production condition, F(1,27) = 456.42, p \ .001, but there was no effect of role
and no production 9 role interaction. Importantly, participants’ production differed
from 50% of the pie in both the low and the high production conditions,
t(30) = 11.61, p \ .001, and t(30) = 8.82, p \ .001.
Proposer Behavior
Across performance conditions, participants proposed on average a split that left
them with 53% (± 12) of the pie with a modal offer of 50%, in line with previous
studies (for a review, see Camerer, 2003). As predicted, offers were affected by
production. The proportion of the pie that proposers wanted to keep correlated
positively with their production, r = .32; p = .014 (Fig. 3a). Put differently,
proposers retained less in the low (49%) compared to high (57%) production
condition, t(27) = 3.53, p \ .01.
To examine whether offers differed significantly from equality, we compared
offers to 50%. To test whether offers differed from equity, we calculated the
difference between the percentage of the pie produced and the percentage retained,
and compared this value to zero. Differences across production conditions at the
group level would indicate a flexible application of justice principles. In contrast,
the absence of this effect would indicate stable preferences, which could then be
further analyzed for whether they reflect the maintenance of an initially
advantageous justice principle, or individual differences that are entirely indepen-
dent of performance condition.
In the low production condition, offers did not differ from equality, t \ 1, ns, but
deviated from equitable splits, t(27) = 6.3, p \ .001: proposers retained more than
they had produced. Results were rather different in the high production condition,
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where offers differed from both equality, t(27) = 3.36, p \ .01, and from equity,
t(27) = 3.9; p \ .001: participants retained more than 50% of the pie, but relatively
less than their production (Fig. 3b, c).
Further analyses showed that offers diverged less from equality in the low than in
the high production condition (-.01, .07), t(30) = 3.49, p = .002. In contrast,
differences from the equity principle were bigger in the low (.19) than in the high
production condition (-.09), t(30) = 7.92, p \ .001.
Responder Behavior
A main effect of offer showed that participants rejected offers that were
disadvantageous and objectively unfair more often (85%) than equitable (8%) and
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equal offers (5%), F(2,181) = 109.88, p \ .001 (Fig. 3d). There was no effect of
production on responders’ acceptance decisions, and no offer 9 production
interaction. Ratings of satisfaction and fairness with a proposed split were strongly
correlated (r = .94, p \ .001).
A main effect of offer, F(2, 32) = 101.58, p \ .001, showed that satisfaction was
higher for equal (7.3) and equitable (6.7) offers than for unfair offers (1.5),
t(24) = 7.7, p \ .001, and t(23) = 11.5, p \ .001, whereas the difference between
equal and equitable offers was not significant, t(23) = .7, p = .49. Follow-up
analyses on a significant production 9 offer interaction, F(2, 32) = 21.67, p \ .001
(Fig. 3e), revealed a selfish bias similar to the proposer. Specifically, in the low
production condition, satisfaction with equal offers was higher (9.0) than with
equitable offers (5.0), t(29) = 9.11, p \ .001, or compared to satisfaction with
equal offers the high production condition (5.4), t(24) = 4.88, p \ .001. In contrast,
in the high production condition, satisfaction with equitable offers was higher (8.3)
than with equal offers (5.4), t(19) = 3.56, p = .002, or compared to satisfaction to
equitable offers in the low production condition (5.1), t(23) = 4.29, p \ .001. There
was no difference in satisfaction with unfair offers in the low (1.5) and high (1.4)
production conditions, t(23) = .41, p = .682.
Ratings of fairness showed a similar pattern (Fig. 3f), but perceived fairness of
equitable splits in the low production condition was relatively higher (6.1). As a
result, in the low production condition, perceived fairness of equal offers was not
rated higher (7.3) than of equitable offers, Z(11) = 1.18, p = .239, but the
difference compared to equal offers in the high production condition (4.8) was
significant, Z(10) = 1.96, p = .050. In contrast, in the high production condition,
fairness of equitable offers was higher (8.4) than of equal offers, Z(8) = 2.39,
p = .017, and marginally higher compared to fairness of equitable offers in the low
production condition, Z(9) = 1.83, p = .067. Additionally, unfair offers were rated
as more unfair in the high (1.6) compared to the low (.4) production condition,
Z(10) = 2.41, p = .016.
Discussion
In the current paper, we examined how individuals negotiate the conflict between
their perceived entitlements in a situation where both parties contribute to a shared
pie and both have decision-making power. With a repeated UG with joint-
production, we examined whether individuals show stable tendencies to select a
particular justice principle, or whether they select different justice principles in
different situations. In support of the latter, we found that individuals apply justice
principles flexibly depending on their relative contributions. When they performed
worse than their (presumed) partner, participants proposed an equal split of the pie,
and when they performed better, they proposed a split that would leave them with
significantly more than the equal share. This indicates a selfish bias, consistent with
findings from the DG with anonymous players (Frohlich et al., 2004; Rodriguez-
Lara & Moreno-Garrido, 2010).
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While offers in the high production condition differed significantly from equality,
they also differed from the equity principle. This result may be explained by the
need of the proposer to anticipate the responders’ reaction. The responder in an UG
may either go along with the justice principle suggested by the proposer, or may
have a similar selfish bias. In the latter case, the proposer may need to adjust his/her
offer to accommodate the responder’s heightened expectations. The resulting offers
thus represent a compromise between the conflicting entitlements of the proposer
and responder. Such compromise may be necessary in order for the proposer to
avoid rejection, which may be the only way for players to reach an agreement
(Komorita & Chertkof, 1973). Our paper further contributes to the literature by
examining the conditions in which a compromise between equality and equity is
more likely to occur. Proposers may be aware of responders expectations
particularly in situations where responders performed poorly, such that an equitable
split would leave the responder with very little in spite of the effort invested in the
production of the pie. Consistent with research on production-based entitlement
(Ruffle, 1998), proposers were more generous in the UG when an equity rule would
have resulted in a particularly low offer that could be rejected. From our data, it is
not clear whether such behavior is due to a selfish strategic adjustment to avoid
rejection (Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004), or whether it reflects a truly
generous consideration of the other’s entitlement.
For a proposer, an equitable split would result in disadvantageous inequality in
the low production condition, and in advantageous inequality in the high production
condition. The fact that offers differed more from equity in the low than in the high
production condition is consistent with the idea that individuals dislike disadvan-
tageous inequalities more than advantageous ones (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).
Because it is less sensitive to strategic thinking, as there is no need to take into
account the other party’s response, responders’ behavior provides a complementary
source of information about the motives underlying decisions in the UG. Similar to
previous research (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001), satisfaction and fairness
ratings were highly correlated in our study. Also, similar patterns of results were
observed for the two ratings. When responders performed worse than the other
player, satisfaction and fairness ratings were particularly high with equal splits, but
when they performed better than the other player, satisfaction and fairness ratings
were particularly high with equitable splits, consistent with a selfish bias.
Nevertheless, responders accepted all offers that complied to an equity or equality
norm, regardless of whether these offers were advantageous or disadvantageous to
them. In contrast, they rejected outright unfair offers that violated both justice
principles.
The difference for satisfaction/fairness ratings on the one hand and acceptance
rates on the other hand may have various reasons. First, it may reflect a higher
sensitivity of the former measure. This could be due to scale properties (continuous
vs. dichotomous). In future research, a continuous measure of responders’ behavior
may provide a more sensitive measure. For example, the minimum acceptable offer
(MAO) could be used. However, participants sometimes accept offers that are
below their MAO, suggesting that they may be more demanding when stating
hypothetical MAOs than when actually deciding (for example, see (Blount &
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Larrick, 2000; Camerer, 2003; Brandts & Charness, 2011). Instead of measures
using hypothetical decisions, continuous behavioral measures may be more
appropriate, such as continuous measure of approach and avoidance using joystick
methodology (Rinck & Becker, 2007). Future research is needed to examine
whether a more sensitive measure of behavior would lead to similar results as the
fairness/satisfaction ratings did in the current study, including different reactions to
equitable and equal offers in high and low production conditions.
Second, differences between satisfaction/fairness ratings and acceptance rates
may also reflect more profound differences between attitudes and different types of
behaviors. One’s satisfaction with an offer may not be reflected in a one-shot
decision to accept or reject the offer, but may influence one’s willingness to interact
again with, trust, or cooperate with the same individual (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu,
2006). Including additional behavioral measures (e.g., a choice whether to interact
with the same partner or not in future UGs) may result in a closer correspondence
between satisfaction/fairness ratings and behaviors.
Third, the emotionally driven tendency to reject offers that are disadvantageous
but comply with a justice principle may not be strong enough to counter the
financial incentive to accept that offer. Reducing the motivating force of the
distributed resource by varying the resource type may lead to a closer correspon-
dence between fairness/reject ratings and accept decisions.
Finally, the dissociation observed here between responders’ fairness/satisfaction
ratings and their acceptance decisions may be a result of the pie sizes used in our
study. Although there is evidence that large variations in pie size (e.g., from $10 up
to $100, see Hoffman et al., 1996) do not affect behavior in the UG, to the best of
our knowledge, no study to date has explored the impact of pie size on responders’
ratings of fairness and satisfaction. In our study, pie size was significantly greater in
the low compared to the high performance condition, because of the comparatively
higher performance of the computer. One consequence is that on average, an equal
offer was worth more money (in absolute CHF amount) in the low than in the high
performance condition (50% of 7 CHF is more than 50% of 3 CHF), which could
explain why equal splits were preferred in the low performance condition. The
opposite was true for equitable offers, which differed in relative (%) but not
necessarily in absolute (CHF) amount, such that equitable splits were not always
economically more advantageous, and thus rated higher on satisfaction and fairness,
in the high (e.g., 70% of 3 CHF) than in the low performance condition (e.g., 30% of
7 CHF). Although we partly controlled for differences in stakes by using fractions as
a dependent measure in the analysis of proposer’s offers, it was not possible to
include pie size as a covariate in the ANOVAs examining the impact of offers and
performances responders’ ratings, because pie size varied across trials within
individuals. Further studies are needed to address whether individuals’ fairness/
satisfaction ratings are affected by the absolute (CHF) and/or relative (%) amount
associated with each type of offer, and whether this is influenced by production.
In our study with anonymous players, we find that the application of justice
principles is flexible and selfish. Previous research suggests that when interaction
partners are non anonymous, or when they expect future interactions, individuals
may, instead of a selfish bias, show a generous bias (Shapiro, 1975; Mikula, 1980;
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Schwinger, 1980). Further research is needed to examine whether generous behavior
is stable or flexible across different situations. Further studies could also address the
generalizability of the present results to non student samples, and also across ages
and cultures, as well as in real interactions.
Conclusions
In this paper, we used an UG with joint-productions to examine how individuals
apply equality and equity justice principles in a situation where both parties
contribute to a shared good and both have decision-making power in the distribution
of this good. Our results show, using a within-subject design, that individuals show
flexible behavior and preferences for equality and equity, depending on their
relative production. They selfishly select the most advantageous justice principle in
any situation: equality when their production is low, but not when their production
is high. In cases where an equitable split would lead to a particularly disadvan-
tageous outcome for the other party, individuals adjust their offers generously: they
trade-off equal and equitable splits. Despite the incongruent views of proposers and
responders due to similar selfish biases, it seems that proposers adjust their offers to
responders’ expectations. Responders show a similar selfish bias as proposers in
their judgments of satisfaction and fairness but not in their acceptance decisions.
They prefer equal splits when their production is low, but equitable splits when their
production is high. Nevertheless, they accept all offers that comply with an equality
or equity principle, and only reject outright unfair offers that violate both justice
principles. This shows that individuals are flexible about which justice principle is
applied, but inflexible in their demand for (some type of) justice.
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